By Sigurd Arild and Ryan Smith
“…it is often very difficult to find out whether a person belongs to one type or the other…” – Jung: Psychological Types §3
A popular means of assertion to back up one’s own type assessments in an argument is to state that someone is “obviously” a certain type instead of producing a proper argument. For example, people may say that Donald Trump is “obviously” an ENTJ and then lean back, content that they have now (in their mind) augmented their case. But in fact, if all they have said is that someone is “obviously” a certain type, then all they have said is that they have no real arguments to back up their claim.
Let us consider the matter as seen through the eyes of two capable epistemologists. First, consider the words of the German mathematician and philosopher Leonard Nelson:
“People who call some piece of knowledge ‘evident’ do not usually have any one clear characteristic in mind. Expressions of this sort are often used simply to describe the certainty that we do in fact have in respect of our judgment; our firm conviction of its truth. The description of a judgment as evident can, however, also bear another and more precise sense: that the state of affairs re-capitulated in our judgment is immediately clear to us, so that the truth of the judgment needs no further illumination, i.e. we do not need to think about it in order to realize that it is true. This means that we are not only certain, i.e. convinced, of the truth of the judgment, but that we are certain in a particular way, namely, that that truth is clear by itself, independently of reflection.” – Nelson: Progress and Regress in Philosophy vol. I (Blackwell 1970 ed.) p. 88
Something may more easily be said to be “obvious” or “self-evidently true” if that thing is a simple and distinct characteristic. For example, the proposition that Donald Trump “obviously” had red hair may more easily be said to be “obvious” or self-evidently true than more complex propositions such as “Trump’s smile communicates smugness.” When we are trying to determine someone’s type, we are not dealing with a simple and distinct characteristic, but with a complex pattern of deductive inferences. Therefore the question of someone’s psychological type is wholly unsuited to this type of prima facie appeal.
One could avert the criticism by adopting a “common sense” philosophy in the vein of Thomas Reid. But the obvious problem then arises that psychological types do not exist as a matter of common sense. If they did, we would hardly have had to wait until 1921 for the first credible theory of truly psychological types to appear. Psychological types could more properly be said to exist as heuristics or Platonic forms; the people who say that types exist as a priori empirical occurrences are at odds with the science.
As Nelson points out, to assert that a claim is “obviously” true can have two meanings: (1) One meaning is to simply declare that one has great personal conviction in one’s own claim. (2) The other meaning is declaring that one has great personal conviction in one’s own claim and that the question at hand is of a kind that needs no reflection in order to be decided.
It is our contention that the matter of determining someone’s type is not a question that can be decided without analysis or reflection. (We have argued the point here, here, here, and here.) So if the premise is granted that (2) can never be true when dealing with the question of someone’s psychological type, then it follows that all people are really saying when they are saying that someone is “obviously” a certain type is that they feel certain about their own judgment. To gauge the value of such statements, let us turn to Karl Popper:
“… I would insist … that these experiences, important as they may be … can never serve to establish the truth of any idea or theory, however strongly somebody may feel, intuitively, that it must be true, or that it is ‘self-evident’. Such intuitions cannot even serve as an argument. … For somebody else may have just as strong an intuition that the same theory is false. … Intuition undoubtedly plays a great part in the life of a scientist, just as it does in the life of a poet. It leads him to his discoveries. But it may also lead him to his failures. And it always remains his private affair, as it were. Science does not ask how he got his ideas, it is only interested in arguments that can be tested by everybody.” – Popper: The Open Society and Its Enemies (Routledge 2002) p. 232
Certitude in one’s own intuitions can never be a real argument. It is a person’s private affair and belongs more fittingly in a personal diary than in an exchange on someone’s type.
Note that we are not trying to discourage anyone from having intuitions about other people’s types. We are merely saying that stating that someone is “obviously” a certain type as a means to back up your claim is not an argument, but at best an attempt to shame or browbeat the other person into submission.
Even if you are someone whose judgment is generally acknowledged to be correct, your personal certitude is still ineligible as an argument because you may still be wrong on this occasion. For example, Jung’s self-assessment as a Ti type presumably led him to commit a series of errors with regards to identifying other Ti types correctly (see note 3 here).
Finally, note that Popper says that we should be interested in arguments that can be tested by anyone. Within the Jungian type community, as well as the field of self-development as a whole, there is a regrettable tendency to “seek a master” who is then presumed to have all the answers. These “masters” are frequently talented and entertaining, but a proper argument is rarely possible with them or with their followers. Even if you refute their stated arguments, show their research to be factually inaccurate, and expose their understanding of Jungian typology as lackluster, you are still bound to get nowhere, because such groupings really depend on group instinct and identity rather than critical argument. They have pawned their critical judgment with the master and are beholden to the convenient delusion that answers to complex questions can be handed to them on a silver platter if they simply stick to their guru.
***
It must be mentioned that though the flinging of unsupported type assessments as “obviously” true is exactly the kind of thing that might be expected from hobbyists on the internet, they are not alone in this regard: Keirsey Jr. has also made use of this technique on several occasions, and even Jung resorted to this sort of non-argument from time to time. Von Franz and van der Hoop were more neutral with regards to the manner in which they advanced their type assessments, while Myers deserves special credit in this regard for stating her type assessments in the non-combative, deferential, and open-ended manner that is conducive to true discussion.
Intuition seems to come with a powerful feeling of certainty. In the grips of my tertiary Ni the entire world looks different, and logical justifications for the view are all to easy to come by. Only later after I’ve been released from the grip of the intuition can I step back and see more clearly that it’s just one of many possibilities. In the case of dominant Ni types I often have the impression that they never get this clear view. The bottom line here is that intuitions are underdetermined, which means there are an infinite number of justifications for them that seem to work.
With specific regards to typing people, this problem rears its head when it comes to MBTI skeptics. Typing people is hard work, and no one has written down the “complex pattern of deductive inferences” needed to type someone. Thus typing is more of an art than a science. The brain is theoretically capable of doing it reliably, but how it might do so while simultaneously overcoming the plethora of cognitive biases that we know of is still unknown. And as Popper said, no one cares where the ideas come from, only whether they are independently verifiable. The explanations for why so-and-so is a certain type found on this website fall short of that. They are not independently verifiable. There really isn’t a flow chart that we can follow to type someone. Indeed, this website claims that most people *can’t* type people, which I consider to be a weird intuition in and of itself. It seems contradictory to simultaneously say that only some people have the “empathy” to type people (which is probably really just an intuition), and that nobody is obviously a type, AND that typing is really a deductive process. Yeah, this is definitely not adding up. Please provide us a flow chart:)
>The explanations for why so-and-so is a certain type found on this website fall short of that. They are not independently verifiable.
That’s not exactly true. The claim itself (“person X is type Y”) is unverifiable, but that is true for *all* such claims, not just ours. That’s why we end with praise for Myers. Discussing social science often has to rely on such means of discussion because the claims themselves are unfalsifiable. But the points provided in our posts are mostly testable by people themselves (by the standards of social science) and so they constitute *some* kind of argument, as opposed to the people who say that someone is “obviously” a type as a (fallacious) means of argument.
>Indeed, this website claims that most people *can’t* type people, which I consider to be a weird intuition in and of itself.
No, it claims that most people can’t become *good* at determining other people’s types. You are correct that this claim is an intuitive extrapolation though: As a matter of fact, most people use Jungian typology behavioristically. That’s not how the theory works. On the basis of the history of psychoanalysis, the history of psychodynamic thinking, and Jungian typology in general, we conclude that a large majority of people find this mode of thinking foreign, flimsy, and nonsensical. They are not naturally at home among such theories and they probably never will be. However, it is correct that this assertion does not rule out that most people could in principle become good at it.
>It seems contradictory to simultaneously say that only some people have the “empathy” to type people (which is probably really just an intuition), and that nobody is obviously a type, AND that typing is really a deductive process.
The point is that it’s both. To readers not acquainted with the point you’re referencing, let us just recap that we’re not talking about empathy as this word is used in everyday language, but about the concept of *cognitive empathy* i.e. the ability to cognitively (not affectively) discern what’s going on in the mind of the other.
Cognitive empathy is used to obtain the type of information about the other that is needed to determine someone’s type. Deductive inferences are used to make sense of that information in relation to the framework of types.
Behaviorism and Big Five are inductive modes of thought. There is a more direct relationship between observation and result (“he is very social, therefore an extrovert”). Jungian typology was developed deductively. For example, in the 1916 letters discussing Psychological Types, published as the book “The Question of Psychological Types,” Jung rejects that there should be such a thing as Fi because it did not fit his observations.
It was only later, when he hit upon the scheme of four functions, each with two orientations, that the deductive framework enabled him to infer the existence of Fi. (This point is also stated in Psychological Types, e.g. he says that people do not “naturally” see or infer the existence of Fi.)
With regards to specific people, the Big Five prides itself on the fact that the five scales are almost independent of one another and that there are billions of different outcomes. What does a person with 100% Extroversion, 100% Neuroticism, and 0% Conscientiousness look like? If you ask a social scientist, our guess is that they won’t know (and nor do we, for that matter). The point is that the Big Five system of personality is inductive, even on an individual scale, in the sense that it treats the model as subservient to the individual. Jungian typology, on the other hand, does no such thing: It postulates a number of types (usually 8 or 16) and then treats the individual as subservient to the model. Thus, when we are trying to determine what type someone is, we are analyzing their personality on a deductive basis, trying to see which of the 16 preexisting possible results that makes the most sense in relation to the individual. Hence you get the Jung quote about every individual being an exception to the rule and hence you get the accusations of stereotyping, pigeonholing, etc.
That someone is a given type is falsifiable, but it would be really expensive to do so.
> They are not naturally at home among such theories and they probably never will be. […] However, it is correct that this assertion does not rule out that most people could in principle become good at it.
Propensity has something to do with it but time on task is ultimately more important. The more I study type the more people’s types jump out at me without me having to think about it. Indeed, thinking about it hardly seems to work. They simply leave a high dimensional impression on me. When I type people this way it’s quite accurate. When I type people by thinking about it, it’s not. That said I think with more extensive practice I would eventually be able to deconstruct thse impressions into a system of rules for typing people.
I strongly suspect that everyone who learns to type people ultimately uses a mix of noticing behavioral patterns, cognitive empathy (theory of mind), emotional empathy (also theory of mind) and both automatically and explicitly finding the type that best fits the identified constraints.
> What does a person with 100% Extroversion, 100% Neuroticism, and 0% Conscientiousness look like? If you ask a social scientist, our guess is that they won’t know (and nor do we, for that matter).
Using the correlations found by McCrae & Costa (1989) we get the following approximations.
E-I = -.74 + .08 + .16 = -.5 = E
S-N = .1 -.15 – .06 = -.11 ~= S
T-F = .19 -.15 + .06 = .1 ~= T
J-P = .15 – .49 + .11 -.23 ~= J
There are numerous issues with this approach that I’m not going to go into, but we can say with confidence they would be an MBTI EJ. Neuroticism doesn’t explain any significant variance in the MBTI by design (and it’s impressive that the design worked). Of course with more subjects it would be “significant.” But it really doesn’t seem to explain much variance, possibly because “neuroticism” is a pretty nebulous concept. Papers that look at the correlations between more specific psychopathologies and personality traits look more interesting.
I’ll lastly note that induction doesn’t work very well, although in principle it can provide useful constraints. None of my friends realize I’m a strong introvert, because whenever they see me I’m quite animated. This same kind of reasoning leads to waffling between types in some of the most well trained psychologists I know. They can see some aspect of every trait in themselves, can’t tell which one is stronger and so walk away saying the MBTI is bogus. Lack of deductive principles makes knowing thyself incredibly hard.. so where’s that flow chart?:)
Re: “The more I study type the more people’s types jump out at me without me having to think about it. Indeed, thinking about it hardly seems to work. They simply leave a high dimensional impression on me. When I type people this way it’s quite accurate.”
Different people may have different approaches, but how do you know whether a given type assessment is accurate?
Re: “I strongly suspect that everyone who learns to type people ultimately uses a mix of noticing behavioral patterns, cognitive empathy (theory of mind), emotional empathy (also theory of mind) and both automatically and explicitly finding the type that best fits the identified constraints.”
I think we are talking on two levels here: (1) What is the bias of a given theory? Jung’s typology has a bias in favor of theory of mind. (2) Do people in practice use a mix of all of these kinds of different elements? Yes. But in theory, all of these elements should be re-interpreted into a theory of mind framework, i.e. an observed trait shouldn’t be interpreted as a trait in itself (as with the Big Five) but should be re-interpreted as an inference regarding the theory of mind postulated by the theory of types.
Re: “…we can say with confidence they would be an MBTI EJ.”
You mean EP. But the point is not what type he would be in Jung’s typology at all. It’s just to point out that there is no qualitative a prioris in the Big Five system the way there is in Jung’s typology. :)
Here’s the fundamental mistake you guys are making: you are dualists! And whether or not property dualism is the correct view, it’s not even relevant to the art of typing someone.
What we ultimately want from personality theory is a cognitive neuroscience explanation for what’s going on in someone’s brain. From this perspective everything about a person is just a behavior.
You guys are saying you are using theory of mind to “know what it’s like” (Nagel, 1974) to be another type. That might be possible. The thing is, there is no real difference between the high fidelity implementation of the behavioral description of the type and “what it’s like” to be that type. They are isomorphic. What does it feel like to be an algorithm? The implementation of the algorithm knows, assuming it’s the kind that can know.
The next step in explaining the problem here is to recognize that the correlations between the MBTI and Big 5 are *huge*, and with more power even more of those correlations would be significant and we could explain even more variance than has been explained in the past. The models are almost the same. Rotate the MBTI onto the Big 5 and you now have much better descriptions for the Big 5’s high dimensional interaction space.
Now add to this that the difference between the brain and the body is fully arbitrary and we can see that a person’s “behavior” is really just their brain working, and a person’s brain working is really just “behavior.” Both the Jung and Big 5 approaches can be boiled down to the question, “Which kind of person gave rise to this behavior?” Where behavior is either observed with video camera or an fMRI scanner.
In the case that you are using theory of mind to type someone, I must note that this is shallow theory of mind (like most kinds are). To some extent you actually know “what it’s like” to be that person. That is precisely the extent to which your type inference is correct and your brain is capable of doing what their brain did. That’s deep theory of mind. The shallow aspect of theory of mind is when you have a conceptual schema for how the other person’s mind works and you are solving the constraint satisfaction problem of fitting their behavior to the model. Another example of shallow theory of mind, just to clarify the notion, is that it’s what most people do when interacting with others: they assume they are basically like themselves. Note that the shallow/deep dichotomy is my own. The key point here is not just that the MBTI is a behavioral theory in the same way that the Big 5 is, but that consciousness isn’t even relevant! Sure, it feels different to be that type, and when using deep theory of mind you can’t help but feel that way. But who cares? How is the fact that you can’t help but feel it relevant? In fact, you guys have claimed that you are using shallow theory of mind to type people, which makes the point even more poignant. The core mistake being, looking at the brain is looking at behavior.
So regarding all of the hullabaloo about this fundamental difference between Jungian psychology and modern personality psychology.. I’m far from convinced!
> how do you know whether a given type assessment is accurate?
I’ve been certified for over a decade. Most of my friends have been typed:)
I wanna know why Britney’s considered ISFP. Just curious…
Re: I’ve been certified for over a decade. Most of my friends have been typed:)
Those are good credentials, though my point was that the matter of someone’s type is still unfalsifiable. We can make better and better conjectures; some are more resistant to criticism than others, but at the end of the day it’s still a claim of an unfalsifiable nature where the practitioner will have to rely on his own judgment.
Re: What we ultimately want from personality theory is a cognitive neuroscience explanation for what’s going on in someone’s brain. From this perspective everything about a person is just a behavior.
That’s really why we aren’t going anywhere in this exchange. We speak about the inherent bias of the theory. You identify some (entirely reasonable) long-term goals of typology as an assumption that not everyone shares. Jung, for instance, didn’t want to arrive at such a type of explanation. We do not share Jung’s view but are rather agnostic; maybe it will be possible, maybe not. For now, as noted, we use Jungian typology as a heuristic or mode of Platonic philosophy.
***
It may be true that, in the end, all of the various psychological theories converge in a common framework. Again we are agnostic. It may also not be true. For the moment it is a metaphysical question. We cannot prove that it is one way or the other.
***
By the definitions you have provided of shallow vs. deep theory of mind, we agree that we use the one referred to as shallow by you. Again we do not deny that your conjecture of long-term convergence is possible, only that it is for now not provable; it is no more than a reasonable hypothesis, a logical extrapolation of the current framework.
> my point was that the matter of someone’s type is still unfalsifiable. We can make better and better conjectures; some are more resistant to criticism than others, but at the end of the day it’s still a claim of an unfalsifiable nature where the practitioner will have to rely on his own judgment.
If we scan 1 million people’s brains, run a cluster analysis and there are 16 clusters that correspond to Jung’s theory, then we have a solid basis for typing someone. So typings are falsifiable in principle. And practitioners are really just advanced neuroimaging devices. We can even talk about devising double blind experiments in which independent practitioners type people and we can get measures of inter-rater agreement etc. We could then follow this up with some neuroimaging studies. The only reason this hasn’t been done is the rampant unscientific skepticism regarding the MBTI which stems from the Not Invented Here syndrome suffocating academia.
> Jung, for instance, didn’t want to arrive at such a type of explanation
It doesn’t matter what Jung wants. As I said above, Jung was really just an advanced neuroimaging device. His explanation can be rotated onto cognitive neuroscience. It’s a fundamental misconception that these explanations are really different. As near as I can tell it stems from thinking that consciousness is somehow relevant to this matter. In terms of explanation, it isn’t. And if you try to make it so you run up against new mysterianism or the hard problem so it’s not useful anyway.
> It may be true that, in the end, all of the various psychological theories converge in a common framework.
Having different frameworks is useful.
The topic of interest here is ultimately whether Jung really has a theory of consciousness. In some sense he does, but the fundamental mistake is to think that this theory is somehow different than “behaviorism.” That’s a philosophical issue, but in terms of science all we can study is behavior – even when looking at the brain – and that’s all Jung could do as well.
The exception to this is what Wilber calls “broad science” and what I call “subjective science.” Some or all of us do try to use deep theory of mind, and all of us are capable to some extent. It’s the real meaning of empathy. We try to feel what it’s actually like to be the other person doing. Let’s change the vocabulary here so that we have warm (deep) and cold (shallow) theory of mind. I doubt that anyone does it from a purely cold, logical perspective. There are some warm theory of mind studies that have been published, but not many. Most people probably use cold most of the time.. I’m personally not sure whether I can even feel Fi although I know for sure what Fe feels like. Given how foreign my ENFP SO makes me feel it could actually be Fi.
Moving on, Platonic forms are only kind of useful here. They are ultimately rooted in science. Take all people and perform a clustering analysis on them and you’ll see something like the 16 types in the data. Then you’re going to call this the “Platonic form.” Yeah ok, but what you really have is a short (lossily compressed) description that explains a bunch of the data. It might be useful to call it a Platonic ideal but I feel like the behaviorist explanation is the most scientific. We can practice broad science but don’t expect anyone to believe you until you follow it up with narrow science. And ultimately the correspondence between narrow and broad science appears to be 1-1. Dualism might be reality, but is it useful to us? How is it useful to typing someone? I don’t see the utility.
It doesn’t seem to me that we’re progressing beyond what’s already been said here.
Re: “If we scan 1 million people’s brains, run a cluster analysis and there are 16 clusters that correspond to Jung’s theory, then we have a solid basis for typing someone. So typings are falsifiable in principle.”
Ok, yes this is correct. But it would also require the dimensions measured to be non-normally distributed (or else you would get the scenario where people at the edge of the clusters will resemble each other more than they will resemble the people within their own clusters). So in practice it seems that verifying a type will remain unfalsifiable, along with the theory of types in itself.
Re: “It doesn’t matter what Jung wants. As I said above, Jung was really just an advanced neuroimaging device. His explanation can be rotated onto cognitive neuroscience.”
My point was not that it mattered what Jung wants, but that your (entirely reasonable) propositions are not shared by everyone and are not self-evidently true for the time being. Lacking empirical evidence as we currently do, the matter is a question of taste in ideas in some sense. See for example the points by Wilson and Flanagan here: https://www.idrlabs.com/articles/2013/09/musings-on-the-kantian-noumenon/
Re: “In some sense he does, but the fundamental mistake is to think that this theory is somehow different than “behaviorism.” That’s a philosophical issue, but in terms of science all we can study is behavior – even when looking at the brain – and that’s all Jung could do as well.”
Yes, it’s a philosophical issue which separates the different theoretical schools of psychology. In forming such theories we can be more or less removed from the direct study of the brain, from hardcore behaviorism to hardcore philosophy. Scientists tend to lean more towards the former, but in our experience people who attempt to mix Jung’s typology with scientific / Aristotelian logic tend to produce an awful quagmire because the theory itself was Platonic from the onset. It’s like Russell says of Aristotle: “Aristotle’s metaphysics, roughly speaking, may be described as Plato diluted by common sense. He is difficult because Plato and common sense do not mix easily.”
Re: “Moving on, Platonic forms are only kind of useful here. They are ultimately rooted in science. Take all people and perform a clustering analysis on them and you’ll see something like the 16 types in the data. Then you’re going to call this the ‘Platonic form.'”
It seems that the chronology is backwards here; modern scientific methods in psychology postdate Jung and the MBTI. And also, I don’t recall any study having found evidence for the fact that people are supposedly clustered around 16 types; I believe it is normally concluded that almost every measurable human trait is normally distributed, psychological as well as physiological. You could then argue that the interplay between Jungian functions is too complex to be measured empirically by our current efforts (and we would agree). So that leaves various possibilities: (1) Science will figure it out. (2) Types are a parascientific pursuit. As I said, we are essentially agnostic, but at present lean towards (2). You seem to lean towards (1) and as I said, that’s entirely reasonable.
> in practice it seems that verifying a type will remain unfalsifiable, along with the theory of types in itself.or off.
The theory isn’t practically unfalsifiable! The theory makes straightforward predictions about how the brain works. There are eight attractors that are composed into a four dimensional binary interaction space with 16 corners. Stick the subjects in the scanner and see if this is true or not. There is already plenty of precedence for so-called behavioral morphs in evolutionary theory. And it doesn’t really matter that we measure continuous traits.. we are talking about the preference of the underlying substrate here, not social desirability. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evolutionary_psychology#Personality
> Lacking empirical evidence as we currently do, the matter is a question of taste
I don’t see how this is a matter of taste at all. Whether or not Jung or Kant’s thinking about phenomenal consciousness is correct is 100% irrelevant to typing someone. The ONLY thing that matters is that the brain is organized in the way that he predicted.
> It seems that the chronology is backwards here; modern scientific methods in psychology postdate Jung and the MBTI.
It doesn’t matter that algorithmic information theory was developed after Plato and Jung. Their brains ARE compression algorithms. Plato sees wispy ideals.. that’s likely because he’s doing Principal Component Analysis with his brain in a basically unconscious way (whereas Wilber does it consciously).
> So that leaves various possibilities: (1) Science will figure it out. (2) Types are a parascientific pursuit. As I said, we are essentially agnostic, but at present lean towards (2). You seem to lean towards (1) and as I said, that’s entirely reasonable.
I’m starting to get the feeling that you are suggesting that consciousness itself is organized into types but this structure is not reflected in the brain. That’s Not Even Wrong. The real question is not whether there is a 1-1 correspondence between the brain and consciousness. There is. The Hard Problem of Consciousness concerns whether we can study phenomenal consciousness scientifically. And we can also ask, as Dennet does, whether our issues with consciousness are really just a misconception.
As I said (and as we discussed via email) this exchange seems stuck at an impasse, and I don’t think it’s of much further use to continue here.
As I said, you seem to approach the theory scientifically and with a scientific-materialist-Aristotelian framework. We approach the theory as a theoretical-Platonic-meta-empirical construct. For the moment, lacking the evidence as we do, whatever option one pursues is a matter of preference (at least we think so). We have written more about that here: https://www.idrlabs.com/articles/2014/06/an-aristotelian-view-of-personality-types/
Given the current state of the evidence, we think reasonable people can disagree. We don’t say that your approach is unreasonable, just that it isn’t self-evident right now. It is an extrapolation that needs more scans and samples to be proven. We are not the right people to procure that evidence, but maybe you are. In that case, more power to you. :)
The heart of the matter here has been quite obfuscated. It has nothing to do with Plato or Aristotle or Jung or anyone. The claim being made is simply that types are a property of consciousness that exist whether or not they are reflected in the brain. As stated, this makes the claim unfalsifiable. This puts this particular perspective in the same category as string theory and all sorts of pseudoscience and quackery. And I think that’s unfortunate. That the structure of consciousness transcends the brain is certainly an interesting idea, but if I believed every unfalsifiable notion I’d be locked up.
Say whatever you want. :) Karl Pilkington is OBVIOUSLY an INTP. Any real typology expert knows that!